The AKP’s biggest achievement over the past year has been pinning on badges. Whether it’s the governor, the district governor, the minister or the MP – whether through manipulation or blackmail – they grab whoever crosses their path on the street and drag them before Erdoğan. Erdoğan, in turn, pins a badge on each of them, granting them immunity, if only for a short while. He has pinned badges on so many people over the past year that he probably can’t even remember their names. It’s said that the biggest badge-pinning ceremony will take place on 14 August, the anniversary of the AKP’s founding. Let’s see what happens?

THE TRANSFER LEADER

In a speech last week, Erdoğan described the turnout as ‘growing interest in the AKP’. After all, MPs, municipality heads and councillors – dozens of people – are queuing up for the hand-kissing ceremony. Could there be any greater proof of this interest?

To use a football term, the AKP is the clear leader of the transfer window. But looking at the names it has signed, the problem is plain to see. There isn’t a single star signing who will contribute to the team. In the past, those signed were put straight into the starting line-up. Numan Kurtulmuş, Süleyman Soylu, Erkan Mumcu and many others made an immediate contribution to the AKP from the moment they joined. The AKP electorate cannot even remember the names of the current recruits until they’ve stepped down from the stage. It is entirely fair to describe these as ‘agent-peddled signings’. The AKP is expecting contributions from figures who have become controversial within their own parties or in the constituencies where they were elected, or who have succumbed to pressure and surrendered their principles. The AKP, which has governed Turkey for 25 years, has reduced itself to a party pinning its hopes on figures seeking personal advancement, those embroiled in financial scandals, or those who, unable to withstand the pressure, have sold out their cause. What’s more, they present this spectacle as a success.

NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY

One might wonder why the AKP persists with these transfers if they yield no positive results. Undoubtedly, there is a payoff to these transfers. The number of MPs in Parliament is increasing. With just a little more support, they will reach the threshold of 360 MPs required for a referendum or early elections. Municipalities, along with their revenue streams, have fallen into the AKP’s hands. In Istanbul, the number of AKP-run municipalities has now surpassed that of the CHP following the latest transfers. Add to this the uncertainty it has created within the opposition, and it is fair to say this is a highly productive arena.

However, all these are merely numerical figures, and there is no clear evidence of their impact on politics. From the public’s perspective, these moves do not appear to be paying off. There is no audience for the claims that those joining the AKP have switched parties because they were influenced by the regime’s actions. In fact, they are mostly reduced to the status of a subject of humour.

Another fact indicating that these transfers have had no serious impact on the public is the opinion polls. Despite the influx of MPs and officials from municipalities over the past year, there has been no measurable increase in support for the AKP. On the contrary, there are serious behind-the-scenes reports suggesting that the new arrivals are causing unease within the party. These objections are even more pronounced at the MP level. Those who believe they are ‘pumping water into the well’ through these defections are very much mistaken.

A DOOMED INVESTMENT

The AKP’s other fatal mistake was to take control of the CHP. The CHP, which had emerged as the leading party in the local elections and had become a serious alternative to the regime, was handed back to Kılıçdaroğlu through the judiciary. In this way, whilst internal party strife would be fuelled on the one hand, on the other, a opposition sphere that would pose no threat to Erdoğan—thanks to the figures they brought into the leadership—would also be delineated.

At first, Erdoğan appeared to have got what he wanted with the annulment ruling. The spectacle of internal party strife, coupled with the fact that the annulled CHP had based its political existence solely on undermining Özel and his team, provided the regime with the opportunity it sought. However, this situation did not last long for several reasons. Firstly, the public very quickly concluded that this was not an internal CHP matter, but rather a regime operation. They viewed the developments through that lens. Secondly, the ‘invalidators’ who took office were a group of figures who were both highly incompetent and deeply discredited. It soon became apparent that they had no social support whatsoever.

Thirdly, and most importantly, the team that had left the CHP behind took swift action. They presented a new face to mainstream politics in terms of both organisation and the financing of politics. It is difficult to say with certainty at this stage, but appointing a ‘butlan’ to the CHP may well have been the worst decision the regime could have made for itself.

THEIR INFLUENCE IS GROWING

Since its founding, the AKP has advanced through alliances. This is a perfectly understandable situation for a political Islamist party with a limited mass base. In a country like Turkey, US support alone is not enough to maintain a regime; you also need to find support from within. It remained allied with liberals and FETÖ for nearly a decade. When this alliance began to crumble in 2014, it found a new one. Perinçek provided external support to figures such as Soylu. It then formalised its alliance with the MHP. The presidential system introduced by the referendum of 16 April 2017 made a 50 per cent vote share mandatory, and alliances became permanent. Erdoğan expanded the alliance each time to reach the 50 per cent threshold. He added parties such as the BBP, DSP and HÜDAPAR to the MHP’s side. In the presidential election, Yeniden Refah also joined this coalition.

Now, even this coalition has fallen into a minority position in the country. Taken together, they do not even reach 35 per cent. That is why he is turning to a new strategy, attempting to bring both Kurdish politics and the CHP on board at the same time. It is fair to say that significant progress has been made regarding the CHP so far. It is now worthwhile to regard the CHP largely as part of the regime.

THE PALACE’S MISTAKE

The fundamental reality that Erdoğan and his regime inner circle fail to see – or, more accurately, refuse to see – begins precisely at this point. In Turkey, the established parties and political institutions have long since lost their organic ties with the people. Today, those parties whose names are emblazoned in huge letters on their signs have become nothing more than empty ‘shells’ occupied by leaders or narrow interest groups, rather than representing any genuine social demand. Consequently, the party alliances that the Palace has established or plans to establish at its desk no longer stand a chance of finding resonance amongst the grassroots.

For from this point onwards, politics in Turkey will grow not through the mere juxtaposition of party signs and badges, but through ‘people’s alliances’ that embrace the public’s real agenda and demands. In an environment where the pot has run dry, justice has vanished and the future has grown dark, no top-down agreement that fails to provide a remedy for the people’s plight can translate into power on the streets.

Moreover, for Erdoğan, this strategy of unification at the top has now evolved into a process that causes more losses than gains. This is because every party that joins the regime bloc, or is sidelined, and every new figure carries with them an immense burden that is impossible to defend. The sins of the past, political inconsistencies, scandals and the deep-seated anger amongst the people are all being carried into the Palace within this baggage. Driven by a desire to secure numerical superiority, the ruling bloc is filling its own coffers with this toxic baggage. However, there is a simple law of physics they have overlooked: a balloon laden with so much weight has no chance of rising. That balloon will only lose altitude and inevitably crash to the ground.

Note: This article is translated from the original article titled Erdoğan'ın en büyük açmazı, published in BirGün newspaper on August 3, 2026.