For nearly two months now, all eyes have been firmly fixed on the opposition camp. Just as people were saying, “Butlan came and went, the CHP has split and is finished”, a critical phase of the process was completed with the founding of the YENİ Party. However, it is far too early for the opposition to declare that “Everything has become clear; no new crisis will arise”. When the peace process is combined with the CHP’s ongoing court cases and indictments, it is clear that the regime still holds a significant arsenal. As the election timetable progresses, these cards will be played one by one.

From the Palace’s perspective, the current picture may appear quite favourable. The peace process is moving forward and the Kurdish movement is sending positive signals; the CHP-led opposition is divided, and the political centre is shifting towards the ruling party’s ranks. One might even go so far as to suggest that, far from securing the majority needed to call an early election, the number of MPs in Parliament required to draft a new constitution has already been reached.

This is the view that greets you when you put on the regime’s glasses and look out from the Palace balcony. However, the reality on the streets is very different, and the political picture circulating from hand to hand does not match this rosy picture.

POLITICS IS SQUEEZED BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

NATO winds have died down, the S-400s are waiting in the hangar; whilst Trump, on the one hand, praises Erdoğan, on the other, he is drawing a line that restricts his room for manoeuvre. This line drawn by Trump is getting in Erdoğan’s way in domestic politics. It is almost impossible to understand what Bahçeli, the junior partner in the People’s Alliance, is trying to achieve. It is unclear whether he is supporting the AKP or undermining it. However, his dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs and the way things are being handled is evident.

It is not just the leadership but also the inner workings of the parties that are in disarray. Dismissals within AKP organisations have become routine news items. As Bilal Erdoğan increases the pressure on the organisations, the security bureaucracy is responding through other channels. The MHP is set to hold its congress in 10 months’ time, and by then, there will be hardly a single provincial organisation left untouched. The new coalition partner, the CHP, has split into three factions within two months. The issue has become so intractable that the AKP-MHP bloc is debating whether refusing to hand the CHP back to Özgür Özel’s team might yield more favourable outcomes for them. The debates centred on the Supreme Court and the month of September are precisely the product of this hesitation.

CANDIDACY DIFFICULTIES AND TIME PRESSURE

A proposal put to Erdoğan roughly two weeks ago quickly fell off the agenda. The suggestion made by AKP MP Serap Özbudun to Erdoğan at a meeting – “Let’s switch to a parliamentary system and you can be President for life” – may have appeared at first glance to be a strong show of support for Erdoğan, but in reality it was an expression of deep desperation.

President Erdoğan has always been perceived as a saviour by AKP members. However, for the first time, Erdoğan’s presence has become a burden – a factor that increases uncertainty. Precisely because Erdoğan is there, the party cannot abandon the presidential system, which has now become a hindrance. If securing 50 per cent voter support is a pipe dream, then continuing with the presidential system in its current form would amount to political suicide. Everyone is aware of the situation. For Erdoğan to win once again, the opposition would have to make a colossal mistake. Without such a mistake, defeat is inevitable for Erdoğan. The AKP leadership and the forces propping up the regime know full well that such a defeat would mean not just losing an election, but losing everything they have left. This is why they are not hiding their search for alternatives. The fact that systemic change is being discussed before specific names is because they do not wish to find themselves directly confronting the Erdoğan regime without being prepared.

THEY ARE FAR FROM THEIR GOAL

At present, there is no clear strategy within the ruling bloc regarding either the system or the candidate. Their sole objective is to win once again, whatever the cost. Another massive obstacle to Erdoğan’s candidacy is the necessity of an early election. As May 2028 approaches, it takes no prophet to predict that the number of parties and MPs willing to vote in favour of an early election will increase. However, an early election forced upon them in March or April 2028 could come as a heavy surprise to Erdoğan. When that day comes, a surprise ‘no’ vote emerging from the ballot box will not be confined solely to the ranks of DEM and CHP.

After all, all the scenarios devised by the Palace are based on the assumption of Erdoğan’s invincibility. Yet time is eroding the regime’s capacity to dictate the terms of the game and is constricting the system around its very founder. For years, Erdoğan has been accustomed to winning by luring his rivals onto his own playing field. Today, however, for the first time, he cannot conceal the fact that he has become the most fragile link in the very system he built. When early elections are on the horizon, the real danger facing the Alliance will not be the opposition’s manoeuvres, but the crumbling foundation of legitimacy within the regime itself. For it is an ironclad rule of politics: in a situation where time is working against you, every extra step you take to cling to power brings you closer to the very defeat you are trying to avoid. Every structure you hastily rally to your side in a panic will only become a burden.

It is now very difficult for the AKP bubble to stay afloat – with or without Erdoğan.

Note: This article is translated from the original article titled Cumhur İttifakı’nın cumhurbaşkanı adayı net mi: Saat Erdoğan’ın aleyhine işliyor, published in BirGün newspaper on July 29, 2026.