Siyasetin öznesi halk olmuş.
Siyasetin öznesi halk mı, figüran mı?
popüler egemenlik sisteminde bireylerin özneliği ellerinden alınarak figüran olarak görüldüğünü belirten analiz, milyonların değişim talebinin siyasetin gerçek öznesini ortaya koyduğunu vurguluyor.
the people, stripped of their status as subjects, were viewed as mere ‘extras’ in a system of popular sovereignty. today, the demand for change from the millions who reject what is being imposed upon them provides an answer to the question of who the true subject of politics is.
The fact that the leadership appointed to the CHP via a decision of absolute nullity transported people to the membership ceremony organised in Istanbul by paying them laid bare the state to which politics has descended. Since the 12 September 1980 coup, citizens—who have been severed from their role as the subjects of politics—are viewed as mere “extras” in the hands of a group of elite politicians. The people, pushed from the playing field to the stands, have been reduced to mere objects—clapping when required and going to the ballot box when the time comes—and have been excluded from all decision-making processes. Political parties, trade unions and even associations have been structured according to the management of an elite group that can be counted on the fingers of one hand. The issue of political parties in particular, alongside the financing of politics and the electoral system, played a decisive role in entrenching a mindset that sidelines the public. A system was established in which decisions are made and statements are made in the people’s name.
Moreover, the system created did not merely reduce millions to the status of extras; it also turned the parties that aligned themselves with the established order into extras. The CHP, seized through a ruling of absolute nullity, became a de facto extra of the regime. No sooner had Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu taken his seat than he began speaking the same language as the regime. Whilst embracing ‘neo-Ottomanist’ rhetoric, he declared that the CHP would be a ‘controlled’ opposition: one that would conduct politics in Ankara, reserve its statements for group meetings, keep its distance from the streets, and not cross the boundaries set by the regime. In such a scenario, the CHP—having lost its connection with the grassroots—even turned citizens who paid to attend membership ceremonies into mere extras. Moreover, the matter was not limited to this. The regime, whose hope in the ballot box was legitimate but which was experiencing a ‘legitimacy’ crisis internally, demonstrated at every opportunity that it was the vehicle for the US and Trump’s regional policies.
THE PEOPLE BELIEVED IN A DIFFERENT STORY
Whilst all this was unfolding, millions who saw that there was no place for them in the political arena other than as extras rebelled against the imposed political paradigm with a demand for ‘change’. Deepening poverty, unending injustice, a reactionary siege, a lack of meritocracy – in short, all the crises caused by this system – gave rise to an unexpected grassroots wave. Whilst the 19 March operations were underway, the enthusiasm displayed by Istanbul University students as they breached the barricades became the driving force behind the Saraçhane protests. The anger that spread from the Maltepe rally to the Anatolian cities—dubbed the ‘strongholds of the regime’—showed that a different story was being written.
Today, although the wind of social opposition may occasionally calm down, it continues to make itself felt in various forms across many parts of the country. In the course of just two months, miners and teachers breached police barricades in Ankara. Environmental activists kept vigil from the Black Sea to the Aegean in defence of trees, water, soil and nature. Pensioners took to the streets from Edirne to Kars, declaring, ‘We want to live like human beings.’ Women raised their voices against violence and discrimination, defying bans. Workers in factories and farmers tried to make their voices heard on behalf of their crops. Whilst journalists rebelled against censorship and repression, students drew attention with the banners they unfurled at their graduation ceremonies. Comedian Deniz Göktaş’s show also turned into a story of resistance. Thousands who opposed the Butlan administration filled rally venues, streets and squares.
Despite all the resources at its disposal, the government failed to suppress this demand for change that had been building up amongst the people. The successive operations carried out against locally elected councils, as well as the absolute annulment imposed on the CHP, not only failed to intimidate society but actually fuelled the anger even further. The people turned their backs with great fury on any political figure who aligned themselves with the regime or evoked the old ways of doing politics.
THE PATH TO CHANGE LIES IN A UNITED STRUGGLE
The demand for change was so powerful that the winds of a social opposition—unconfined to seats of power, podiums, party headquarters or parliament—are making themselves felt. The people wish to reclaim the politics taken from them years ago, declaring themselves the subject of that politics. Today, the missing piece needed to bring together the fragmented protests—from teachers to miners, from environmentalists to women, from students to workers, from civil servants to pensioners—lies in finding a way to transform these protests into a united front of struggle against the regime.
THEY DO NOT WANT TO EMPOWER THE PUBLIC
Political Scientist Onur Alp Yılmaz: “After 12 September, society was deliberately and intentionally made the object of politics; it was reduced to a mere voting relationship, losing its capacity to articulate its demands or act as a political agent during any interim period other than going to the polls every four or five years. Before 1980, social demands had to be constantly voiced through trade unionism and street politics. When they went unheard, this led to crises and threatened the regime. However, 12 September succeeded in putting a stop to this.
Both the fact that capital has become an undisputed force in Turkey, and the fact that luxury and ostentation have become objects of envy… I would even summarise it as follows: From the point of aiming to reach the goal of ‘contemporary civilisations’—which, after all, required a collective consciousness—people deviated from this goal and instead embraced the notion of ‘striking it rich’. These were individuals once associated with such immorality and widely disliked for appropriating the surplus value collectively produced by society; yet, after 1980, they all suddenly became role models. Naturally, this had an extension into political life as well. After all, that is what we call politics. Whatever social goal you wish to achieve, politicians represent it politically because this is a historical bloc. That is why, just as we saw after the 1980s, we still see this approach today.
In fact, both in interviews I gave to BirGün and in articles I wrote after 19 March, I had expressed the following: ‘The greatest obstacle facing the opposition is the likelihood that the political elite will not abandon their traditional style of politics,’ I had said. Because, in fact, the ‘activism’ of society—what you’re referring to—its becoming the subject of politics, means both the emergence of alternatives to politicians and a world where people do not pin their hopes solely on these individuals to conduct politics, and consequently do not idealise them.
But in reality, this institutional politics we’re discussing derives all its power from leader figures and politicians who have been heroised and who perceive society as a single entity. Consequently, as many of these people have also grown wealthy through politics, they’ve actually found themselves facing a situation where, on the one hand, there is a regime that wants to eliminate them, but on the other hand, there is a regime that wants to protect them – and for this reason, they do not wish to empower society as an active agent. We were faced with such a peculiar situation. So, if this question is being framed within the context of a new party, as far as I can see, it does not appear that this mindset has been abandoned yet. In other words, at the end of the day, we are still confronted with a mindset in which society is perceived as merely the object of these issues. Because, as I said, these political elites are not acting out of a genuine impulse to engage in social politics beyond their own circle of friends; they are merely ‘pretending’ to do so. In other words, the process from 19 March to the present day has been just like this. For the time being, my view of what lies ahead is also taking shape along these lines.”
Note: This article is translated from the original article titled Figüran değil, özne siyaseti, published in BirGün newspaper on July 28, 2026.