The two-day NATO meeting in Ankara has concluded. Political Islamists are grinning from ear to ear. Full-page headlines were published as if a magnificent feat had been achieved. Granted, the resumption of the Iranian war before Trump’s plane had even taken off, along with the S-400 and F-35 issues remaining up in the air, dampened their spirits slightly, but they did not lose hope. For a week, it has been recounted that Türkiye and Erdoğan were the stars of the two-day meeting.

It is very clear that the summit had only one star, and that was none other than US President Trump. His remarks at every meeting were debated and set the agenda. He categorised those he loved, those he disliked, and those he deemed enemies. He expressed that NATO should align itself accordingly. EU countries are not entirely convinced. There are still topics on which they dig their heels in. However, he received full support from Türkiye.

And why wouldn't he? There was no possibility for Trump—who kept talking about how much he loved the AKP President Erdoğan and what a beautiful relationship they shared—not to receive support.

DID ERDOĞAN GET WHAT HE WANTED FROM THE SUMMIT?

The compliment match that continued between Erdoğan and Trump for two days indicates that the government obtained the support it desired. Nevertheless, it is possible to see who this support will benefit domestically and what function it serves in the struggle between the government and the opposition, in the operation carried out against Çankaya Municipality immediately afterwards. However, the real curiosity is whether Trump will reveal his hand regarding the ongoing struggle within the AKP.

The existence of an as-yet-unnamed struggle, continuing through the security bureaucracy and the Palace circle, is now accepted by everyone. In fact, this debate persists in the form of "Will Türkiye become Azerbaijan or Russia?" The struggle, which for now revolves around the media, has reached a dimension that will very soon spread to other fields.

Erdoğan is a figure accepted and needed by both sides today. Therefore, no one enters—or can enter—into a struggle against Erdoğan. Nonetheless, the fact that Erdoğan's side is clear in this intra-government struggle complicates the matter. The fact that he wishes the country to be governed by someone from his own family or someone close to him, and that he is paving the stones accordingly, brings the tension to the present day. In his relationship with Trump and the West, and in the process of organising the party and state mechanism, Erdoğan now needs to take this situation into account. Five years ago, Erdoğan did not have such a problem. But today he does. He has found himself forced to think about the aftermath of his tenure from today onwards.

HAKAN FİDAN BACK ON STAGE

Let us summarise the above evaluation under three headings:

There is a struggle within the ruling power between the Palace and the security bureaucracy regarding the post-Erdoğan era.These factions need Erdoğan.Erdoğan is an explicit side within this struggle.

Now, let us look at the NATO summit again in the light of these evaluations. Erdoğan is the main actor; no one would object to that. The fact that the second figure is Hakan Fidan is also indisputable. His bilateral meetings with his US counterpart prior to the summit, the critical meeting he held with Putin, and the contacts he established with the Gulf countries have pushed Fidan—who had been drawn into the shadows for a while—back onto the political stage. The way the assessments he made after the summit found coverage in the international media also caused the domestic spotlights to turn towards Fidan.

THE PATH SPLITS IN MANY PLACES

It is no coincidence that the name of Hakan Fidan is being spoken of so much these days. Just as it is no coincidence that names like Bilal Erdoğan, Akın Gürlek, and Berat Albayrak are being mentioned. Türkiye is at a historical crossroads. The country is in a process wherein the regime will either consolidate itself or rid itself of it. The ruling bloc, which favours the regime, and the broadest opposition standing against it are the sides of this parting of ways. Yet this is not the only crossroads. The moment the regime finds a chance to consolidate itself, it will face a second parting of ways. The contemporary actors in this parting process will be the names we listed above. Every step these figures take will provide us with clues regarding the orientation and the president of the future regime.

For that reason, just like the media operations of the judicial bureaucracy, every direct contact Hakan Fidan makes with Putin or his intimacy with US Secretary of State Rubio will occupy the country's agenda.

The path of the AKP and Erdoğan has once again led to a crossroads. There is no chance of fleeing from here or turning back. Trump will not be sufficient to continue on the path either. In the coming years, perhaps the world will talk about Rubio far more than Trump. Therefore, steps must be taken now. The problem is that taking such a step at the weakest moment of a 25-year process carries great risk.

While everyone is focused on the CHP, the real state of paralysis could be experienced within the ruling bloc. Topics such as NATO, the US, the Solution Process, the approach towards the opposition, and the religion-politics relationship are highly likely to entangle the ruling bloc's feet.

The photograph of the NATO summit points to one place, while its video points to another. As the time for Erdoğan to step down from the stage approaches, the backstage becomes active. Despite the possibility of weakening in a short period, a compulsory move that will fundamentally resolve all of these issues could come from Erdoğan.

Note: This article is translated from the original article titled Trump kime el verdi, Erdoğan mı Fidan mı?, published in BirGün newspaper on July 13, 2026.